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1   INTRODUCTION 
The Horn of Africa continues to be 
engulfed in a crisis. Political transitions 
have taken place in the East and the 
Horn of Africa sub-region in the recent 
past. Human rights violations continue 
to occur in Somalia, Eritrea, South Sudan 
and Sudan. The above-mentioned 
regions are fraught with tension and are 
home to recurring cycles of conflict, 
primarily due to conflicting geopolitical 
 
LAW 




 DEMOCRACY  
& DEVELOPMENT 
VOLUME 19 (2015) 
 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ldd.v19i1.2   
ISSN:  2077-4907 
LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/ VOL 19 (2015) 
 
Page | 30  
 
and economic interests, as well as environmental factors that have led to frequent 
droughts and prolonged spells of famine.  
The southward movement of migrants from Ethiopia and Somalia to Kenya, as a 
transit or destination country, has assumed a multi-layered and multi-causal dimension 
over the last 20 years. Migrants who are part of this movement often have South Africa 
in mind as their final destination. The movement has evolved from one involving 
refugees and asylum seekers to one which, in the 21st century, has been typified as 
mixed migration.  Mixed movements (flows) are, according to the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), “[c]omplex migratory population movements that 
include refugees, asylum-seekers, economic migrants and other migrants, as opposed to 
migratory population movements that consist entirely of one category of migrants.”1 
The movement of Somalis and Ethiopians commenced in the mid-20th century, 
and was exacerbated by the fall of the Mengistu rule in Ethiopia, and the Siad Barre 
regime in Somalia, in 1991.2   Influxes are dependent on the prevailing social, political, 
and climatic conditions in the regions of Somalia and Ethiopia. In Somalia, the early 
1990s were characterised by displacement as a result of civil war. In 1991, the fall of the 
Siad Barre regime resulted in anarchy and violence. Somalis began to troop to Kenya 
during this period when key resources were controlled by warlords.  
In 1992 the registered Somali refugee population in Kenya had risen to 285 000, 
and by January 2015 it had reached 462 970,3 an increase attributed to insecurity and 
an acute drought in the Horn of Africa. In 2007 the border between Kenya and Somalia 
was officially closed.4  However, the 682 km of border is open and porous, allowing the 
undetected entry and exit of migrants.5 Reports abound of harassment by Kenyan 
police, extortion, arbitrary arrests and the detention of Somali asylum seekers, refugees 
and Ethiopian migrants.6  The migrants are arrested, detained and charged with being 
unlawfully present in Kenya. They are dealt with in summary criminal proceedings 
which involve a plea of guilty, punishable by a year’s imprisonment in lieu of a fine 
and/or a repatriation order.  
                                                 
1  Perruchoud R & Redpath-Cross J (eds) Glossary on migration  law 2nd ed (Geneva: International 
Organization for Migration 2011) at 63. Available at  
http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/Glossary%202nd%20ed%20web.pdf (accessed 12 January 
2015). 
2  Lindley A “Leaving Mogadishu: Towards a sociology of conflict-related mobility” (2010)23 Journal of 
Refugee Studies 1 at 3. 
3  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees “UNHCR country operations profile – 
Kenya” (2015) UNCHR. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483a16.html  (accessed 12 January 
2015). 
4 ‘Kenyans close border with Somalia’ BBC News 3 Jan 2007 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6227083.stm 
(accessed 15 January 2015). 
5  IOM C In pursuit of the southern dream: victims of necessity  (2009) at 55. Available at 
http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/In_Pursuit_of_the_Southern_Dream.pdf (accessed 15 January 
2015). 
6  Human Rights Watch “Welcome to Kenya, police abuse of Somali refugees” (2010).  Abdi A “Police 
arrest 55 Ethiopian immigrants on transit” The Standard 7 Oct 2011. Also available at 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000044323/police-arrest-55-ethiopian-
immigrants-on-transit (accessed 15 January 2015).  
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In Khali Abdiaziz Mohammud and Three Others v Republic,7 the appellants had 
been charged with being unlawfully present in Kenya, in violation of section 13(2)(c) of 
the Immigration Act8, which has since been repealed.  The Senior Resident Trial 
Magistrate rejected the pleas in mitigation and instead highlighted the fact that by 
unlawfully crossing the Kenyan border with Somalia at a time when the border was 
closed, the appellants had breached Kenyan peace, security and sovereignty and had 
posed a danger to Kenya. They were sentenced to serve one year in prison, after which 
they were to be repatriated. On appeal to the High Court of Kenya in Nairobi, the trial 
court judgment was set aside and the sentence was reduced to a fine of about US$ 135 
or two months’ imprisonment, but the repatriation order was upheld. The High Court, 
per Ojwang J, set aside the trial court judgment on the basis that the magistrate had 
erred in law and fact by failing to take account of the pleas in mitigation submitted by 
the appellants and the fact that they were first offenders. The court was highly critical of 
the harsh punishments imposed, pointing out that “that there is now a trenchant body 
of jurisprudence on sentencing, which carries a policy discouraging overkill in the 
imposition of prison terms, where the outcome of a prison term, far from inuring to the 
benefit of Kenya and Kenyans, merely dispenses vengeful penalty against aliens.”9 
However, in practice, a vicious cycle of recidivism ensues, with migrants re-
attempting the journey after being deported.10 The use of smugglers decreases the risk 
of detection by police, but unofficial routes utilised consist of hazardous vast terrain and 
vast wildernesses, rendering the migrant susceptible to the whims of the smuggler.11  
Smugglers rarely take into consideration the basic survival necessities of migrants, such 
as, food, water and shelter, during the journey. In addition, smugglers may abuse the 
migrants physically, or abandon them in the course of the journey out of fear of being 
detected. The smuggling enterprise consists of a chain of people accountable to a boss, 
the chief smuggler. The latter, who is a key actor in the irregular movement of people, is 
often well-known to the community, the smuggled migrant, and/or the financier of the 
transaction. He is also known to the authorities, but nothing is done to bring him to 
book.12 This inaction is attributable to the allegedly corrupt public officials who collude 
with the smugglers in the smuggling enterprise. Moreover, the plight of the smuggled 
people is aggravated by the immigration officials’ insistence on using the criminal 
justice process as a way of dealing with the smuggled migrants, while the profiteers and 
                                                 
7 Criminal Appeal 325, 326 & 327 of 2007 [2007] eKLR available at 
http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/40624/ (accessed 28 November 2014). 
8 Cap 172 Laws of Kenya. 
9 At 3-4 of judgment. Available at http://www.kenyalaw.org (accessed 15 November 2014). 
10 Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) Regional mixed migration summary for October 
2014 covering mixed migration events, trends and data for Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Puntland, Somalia, Somaliland and Yemen (2014) at 1. Available at 
http://www.regionalmms.org/fileadmin/content/monthly%20summaries/July_2014_RMMS_Summary.p
df (accessed 19 January 2015). 
11Horwood C ‘In Pursuit of the Southern Dream: Victims of Necessity, An Assessment of the Irregular 
Movement of Men from East Africa and the Horn of Africa to South Africa’ (2009) IOM. Available at 
http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/In_Pursuit_of_the_Southern_Dream.pdf (accessed 13 August 
2015) at 69.  
12 Horwood (2009) at 8. 
KENYA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SMUGGLING PROTOCOL 
Page | 32  
 
facilitators are left off the hook. Although difficult to estimate in scale, migrant 
smuggling has grown into a multimillion dollar enterprise, involving transnational 
organized criminal elements. It is against this background that the discussion now turns 
to   the 2004 United Nations Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea 
and Air, commonly referred to as the Smuggling Protocol, which supplements the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC). 
The international legal framework requires (a) the decriminalisation of the 
smuggled migrant, whose movement is facilitated by an organised criminal group; and 
(b) the criminalisation of facilitators and profiteers of the movement. The smuggling of 
migrants points to several phenomena, namely, the existence of criminal elements 
within the community; corruption among State officials and their complicity with other 
State  and non-State actors; irregular  movement of people; and the exploitation of a 
desperate population of migrants from the countries of origin.13 
This article assesses Kenya’s progress in the implementation of the Smuggling 
Protocol in relation to the influx of irregular migrants from Somalia and Ethiopia. It 
analyses some of the features of organised crime and the revised immigration law that 
was enacted after Kenya adopted a new constitution in 2010. The article also explores 
the deleterious effects of the smuggling of migrants on both the countries of origin and 
destination. Finally, it recommends measures to increase the protection of the growing 
number of migrants willing to make the hazardous journey south, from Ethiopia and 
Somalia.  
2 TERMINOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Smuggling of migrants 
 
The IOM has defined the smuggling of migrants as “the intentional organization or 
facilitation of the movement of persons across international borders, in violation of laws 
or regulations, for the purpose of financial or other gain to the smuggler”.  The 
internationally recognised definition is contained in Article 3(a) of the Smuggling 
Protocol, while illegal entry is defined in Article 3 (b). The definition raises two 
questions: First, who are the parties involved in the smuggling process? Secondly, can a 
person subjected to smuggling be described as a victim of a crime, or would it be more 
accurate to label such a person as a criminal?  
A smuggler who is directly or indirectly involved in the smuggling of migrants is 
“an intermediary who moves a person by agreement with that person, in order to 
transport him/her in an unauthorized manner across an internationally recognized 
state border.”14 The person aided by the smuggler to enter a country illegally is a 
                                                 
13 See Cheryuiyot J K Assessing the capacity of the department of immigration in the control of human 
smuggling in Kenya: a case of Somali and Ethiopian illegal immigrants (unpublished Masters in Sociology 
research project paper University of Nairobi: Nairobi 2014) at 20-21 and 59-60. 
14 Perruchoud and  Redpath-Cross (2011) at 91. 
LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/ VOL 19 (2015) 
 
Page | 33  
 
smuggled migrant.15 Hazardous living conditions caused by unemployment and poverty, 
let alone natural disasters and wars, have resulted in an increased demand for the 
affected people to migrate. This heightened demand for migration far outstrips the 
number of ways in which people can cross international borders legally.16 The smuggler 
responds to the increased demand for migration by exploiting the vulnerabilities and 
precarious situation of migrants for profit.  
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) states that “a smuggled 
migrant is not considered to be a ‘victim of migrant-smuggling’, because, generally, a 
person consents to being smuggled.”17 However, smuggled migrants have given horrific 
accounts of their ordeals during the smuggling process. They have complained about 
being crammed into small, windowless spaces, sometimes filled with faeces and vomit, 
deprived of food and water, and of having witnessed the corpses of their  deceased 
companions being discarded into the sea or left in the wilds. Some have described how 
they have been assaulted physically and subjected to psychological abuse. In this regard, 
smuggled migrants can become victims of crime as a result of the smuggling process, 
and in some instances have been exploited by human traffickers.18 
 Ironically, smugglers operating in Ethiopia and Somalia invariably call 
themselves “travel agents” and do not necessarily consider their activities to be 
criminal. They view themselves as providers of a humanitarian service, assisting 
persecuted populations to escape to safety. Similarly, smuggled migrants do not view 
themselves as victims of a crime, despite the abuse they experience during, and as a 
result of, the smuggling process. Migrant smuggling has been described as a complex, 
ever-changing crime committed by various forms of criminal networks that are difficult 
to combat.19 
2.2 Smuggling of migrants versus trafficking in persons 
Smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons are distinct concepts although they 
overlap significantly. In some instances, what begins as a case of migrant smuggling 
ends with the smuggled migrant becoming a victim of trafficking. In practice, it has been 
difficult to distinguish between the two concepts. Trafficking in persons is defined 
comprehensively in Article 3(a) of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
                                                 
15 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime “In-depth Training Manual on Investigating and Prosecuting 
the Smuggling of Migrants Vienna” UNODC (2011) at 2. Available at 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Migrant-Smuggling/In-
Depth_Training_Manual_SOM_en_wide_use.pdf (accessed 26 January 2015). 
16 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime “Implementation framework for action to implement the 
Smuggling of Migrants Protocol” UNODC (2012) at 3. Available at 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Migrant-
Smuggling/Framework_for_Action_Smuggling_of_Migrants.pdf  (accessed 26 January 2015). 
17 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime “Model law against the smuggling of migrants Vienna” (2010) 
at 19. Available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-
trafficking/Model_Law_Smuggling_of_Migrants_10-52715_Ebook.pdf (accessed 26 January 2015). 
18 UNODC (2010) at 20. 
19 UNODC (2012) at 3. 
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Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Trafficking Protocol).20 The 
definition can be examined through its three constituent elements: the activity, the 
means and the purpose.  
The activity involves the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or 
receipt of a person. The means include the use of force, threat of force or coercion, 
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power, abuse of a position of vulnerability, or 
giving or receiving of payments. The means used negate any consent that may have 
been given to the activity.21 The purpose is always exploitation, the various forms of 
which Article 3 (a) lists as including the exploitation of the prostitution of others, other 
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to 
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. All three constituent elements must be 
present for the offence of trafficking to be committed.  
For example, a young woman from Ethiopia is deceived about an employment 
opportunity at a hotel in Nairobi. When she arrives in the city she is directed to a 
household of ten where she works 18 hours a day as a domestic worker, with little or no 
pay. When she complains about her working conditions, she is threatened with arrest 
and deportation for being in the country illegally.  In this scenario, all the constituent 
elements of trafficking in persons have been fulfilled. The young lady was recruited 
through deception and subjected to servitude. Furthermore, her co-operation is ensured 
through threats. The three elements constitute the actus reus of the offence. 
The means mentioned above do not have to be proven where the victim of 
trafficking is a child.22 It suffices to prove that the activity took place for the purpose of 
exploitation. Trafficking in persons may be established as a strict liability offence. In 
jurisdictions that require mens rea as the subjective element of the offence, it must be 
proved that the perpetrator committed the material act with the intention to exploit the 
victim, and with knowledge of the unlawfulness of the conduct.23 The actual exploitation 
does not need to take place; it is sufficient to demonstrate that exploitation was 
intended. 
2.3   Similarities and differences between smuggling and trafficking 
Criminals may traffic and smuggle persons in the same movement, utilising similar 
routes and transportation methods.24 Smuggled migrants willingly submit themselves 
to the smuggling process. Trafficked victims, on the other hand, do not consent to being 
trafficked, and if they do, their consent is rendered meaningless by the deception of the 
trafficker. The key differences between smuggling and trafficking as described by the 
UN Office on Drugs and Crime are elaborated below. 
 
                                                 
20 Adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25, and it supplements the UN Convention. It entered into 
force on 25 December 2003 (Trafficking Protocol). 
21 Trafficking Protocol Art 3 (b). 
22 Trafficking Protocol Art 3 (c). 
23 UNODC (2011) at 6.  
24 UNODC (2011) at 8. 
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2.3.1   Smuggling as a trans-national crime 
The smuggling of migrants must involve an element of trans-national movement. The 
migrant must cross a legally recognised border in violation of the destination country’s 
requirements for admission. The offence of trafficking, on the other hand, does not 
necessarily entail a transnational element; it is concerned with the intended 
exploitation of the victim.25Victims of trafficking may be bought from, and sold to, 
different traffickers and moved within the country or from one country to another 
through regular or irregular means.26  
2.3.2   Consent 
The trafficked migrant does not consent to the trafficking process and where he or she 
does, such consent is vitiated by the means set out in Article 3 (b) of the Trafficking 
Protocol. The smuggled migrant, on the other hand, actively seeks out the smuggler, and 
pays for his services to facilitate the irregular movement to the desired country of 
destination. The hazardous conditions that smuggled migrants face in some instances 
may, however, cause them to withdraw their consent during the journey. 
2.3.3.   Exploitation 
The human trafficker and smuggler both engage in the illegal conduct for profit. The 
smuggler and the migrant enter into an agreement that ends upon illegal entry or 
crossing into the destination country. The consideration is a sum agreed upon by both 
parties, and the contractual relationship ends with the illegal entry into the country of 
destination.  In contrast, the trafficker deceives his victims with the intention to exploit 
them.  The victim does not consent to the intended exploitation and the relationship 
between the two parties may persist long after the beginning of the trafficking process. 
In practice, a smuggled migrant may end up a victim of trafficking, and this happens 
where the smuggler or a third party exploits the smuggled person’s irregular status or 
vulnerable position for benefit.  
2.4   Irregular migration 
There is no clearly accepted universal definition of irregular migration. The IOM defines 
it as “movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit 
and receiving countries”.27 Both human trafficking and smuggling occur within the 
rubric of irregular migration. An irregular migrant is “a person who, owing to 
unauthorized entry, breach of a condition of entry, or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks 
legal status in a transit or host country”.28 
                                                 
25 UNODC (2011) at 11. 
26 UNODC (2011) at 7. 
27 Perruchoud & Redpath-Cross (2011) at 54. 
28 Perruchoud & Redpath-Cross (2011) at 54. 
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2.5   Mixed migration 
The IOM defines mixed flows as “complex migratory population movements that include 
refugees, asylum-seekers, economic migrants and other migrants, as opposed to 
migratory population movements that consist entirely of one category of migrants”.29 
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) describes mixed migration as 
“people travelling in an irregular manner along similar routes, using similar means of 
travel but for different reasons”.30 Victims of trafficking are sometimes part of this 
movement. Human smuggling is at the centre of mixed migration movements and is 
aided by corruption during the border crossing process.31  The challenge in dealing with 
mixed migration movements is to identify migrants with a legitimate claim to asylum 
and to provide appropriate assistance to other migrants who are similarly vulnerable 
but fall outside the purview of refugee protection. 
2.6   Refugees and asylum seekers 
A refugee is defined in the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.32 An asylum 
seeker is a person who is awaiting status determination for refugee protection.  
Towards the end of the 20th century the movement of refugees and asylum seekers has 
been characterised as forced migration. The IOM defines forced migration as “a 
migratory movement in which a level of coercion exists, including threats to life and 
livelihood whether arising from natural or manmade causes.”33 Forced migrants include 
groups that do not fit within the legally defined limits of a refugee, such as, people 
displaced by natural disasters and those who have not yet crossed an internationally 
recognised border.  
2.7  Organised crime and transnational organised crime 
Organised crime has so far eluded a universally accepted definition. Article 2(a) of the 
UNTOC defines an organized criminal group as a “structured group of three or more 
persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing 
one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, 
in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit”. The 
UNTOC definition, like the one proposed by Interpol and the European Commission, 
does not consider the loosely structured and fluid nature of most organised crime 
                                                 
29 Perruchoud & Redpath-Cross (2011) at 63.  
30 UNHCR “Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in Distress at Sea – how best to respond?” Expert Meeting in 
Djibouti, 8 - 10 Nov 2011 Background Paper (2011) footnote 1 at 1. Available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4ec211762.pdf (accessed 24 January 2015). 
31 See UNODC Issue Paper Corruption and the smuggling of migrants Vienna: UNODC (2013) at 6-7. 
Available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/human 
trafficking/2013/The_Role_Of_Corruption_in_the_Smuggling_of_Migrants_Issue_Paper_UNOD  (accessed 
24 January 2015).  
32 Art 1 A (2). 
33 Perruchoud & Redpath-Cross (2011) at 39. 
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syndicates. Smuggling networks in East Africa, for example, have loose formations 
which constantly change, depending on the desired criminal objective.  
3 HISTORY OF THE SOUTHWARD MOVEMENT OF SOMALIS AND ETHIOPIANS 
Since the 1970s, the Horn of Africa, which comprises Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti 
and Sudan, has been known internationally as a region whence refugees emanate. 
Involuntary movements have been attributed to political, economic and environmental 
factors. In some instances, governments have also been accused of manipulating 
irregular population movements to achieve selfish political gains. 
3.1 Somalia 
In 1967, the last democratic election held in the Republic of Somalia resulted in the 
formation of a de facto one-party state. Public dissatisfaction with the unfolding events 
led to the assassination of President Abdirashid Shermake and the staging of a bloodless 
coup in 1969. Siad Bare, previously commander of the army, became the President. The 
state took on a socialist orientation, and in 1977, following a renewed attempt at Pan-
Somalism, Somalia attacked Ethiopia. The conflict, in which Somalia was defeated, 
spawned the first movement of Ogaden refugees fleeing from Ethiopia to Somalia.34   
Clan polarisation, endemic war, famine, starvation, and growing inequality in 
contravention of the Somali egalitarian ideal led to the collapse of the state in January 
1991. An estimated one million Somalis moved to surrounding countries and overseas 
destinations. Mohamed Farah Aided, who took over from the military coup of Siad 
Barre, died in Mogadishu in 1996, succumbing to wounds sustained during fighting in 
the capital. 
Today, the anarchy and polarisation that have characterised the post-
independent state of Somalia more or less persists, making Somalia the second most 
fragile state in the world.35 Numerous attempts have been made to re-establish social 
and political cohesion.  A failed United Nations peacekeeping mission, backed by United 
States marines, was withdrawn in 1995. A fourteenth attempt to establish a central 
system of government resulted in the election of Abdullahi Yusuf as President in 2004. 
Yusuf’s government was inaugurated in Kenya.  
The transitional government met for the first time in Baidoa, Somalia, in 2006. 
Successive years were characterised by heavy fighting between the transitional 
government and Islamists, wrestling for control of Mogadishu. This state of affairs was 
aggravated by periodic spells of severe drought, resulting in a deepening humanitarian 
crisis. In 2011 alone, 164 375 Somalis fled to Kenya and 101 333 to Ethiopia.36 Some 
                                                 
34 Gundel J “The migration-development nexus-Somalia case study” (2002) 40 (special issue) 
International Migration 255 at 257. Available at http://www.somali-jna.org/downloads/Gundel%20-
%20Dev%20Mig%20Nexus%20Somalia%20.pdf (accessed 25 January 2015). 
35 Fund for Peace (FPP) “Fragile states index 2014.” Available at http://ffp.statesindex.org/ (accessed 29 
January 2015). 
36 Amnesty International Annual Report 2012. Available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/somalia/report-2012 (accessed on 27 January 2015). 
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countries deported them back to Somalia despite the risks they would face.37 An African 
peace keeping mission, backed by the United Nations, arrived in Mogadishu in 
December 2007.  At the end of 2008, President Yusuf resigned, following a vote of no 
confidence in his government, and he was replaced by the moderate Sheikh Sharif, who 
was elected by Parliament. 
  Towards the end of 2011, and going into 2012, an African Union army supported 
the government’s forces to wrestle major cities from the al Qaeda linked Islamist group, 
al Shabaab. In August 2012, the first parliament in more than 20 years was sworn in in 
Mogadishu, and Hassan Sheik Mahmoud was elected President. This was the first 
democratically elected government in Somalia since 1967.38  
The Somali community is primarily pastoralist in nature, with an agriculturally 
based economy. Migration is prevalent within the community in search for work and 
study opportunities in neighbouring countries and further afield. This has been the case 
since the 1920s, however, recent movement has been attributed to the poor state of 
human security.  The fall of the Siad Barre regime, followed by the humanitarian crisis 
caused by the civil war and famine during the repressive years of warlord Farah 
Mohamed Aideed’s guerrilla insurgency, resulted in the mass movement of people from 
Somalia. The more affluent Somalis moved to North America, Europe and the Gulf 
States, with the lesser privileged going to Kenya and surrounding countries in East 
Africa.39 Conflict, poverty, drought, and food security have escalated the movement in 
recent years. 
3.2 Ethiopia 
Ethiopia, with a population of 90 million, is the second most populous country in Sub-
Saharan Africa.40 Over the last decade the country has experienced strong economic 
growth, averaging 10.9 per cent per year from 2005 to 2013.41 The economic boom has 
helped to alleviate the incidence of poverty and has contributed to making it possible 
for Ethiopia to achieve significant progress towards reaching the Millennium 
Development Goals with regard to reducing child mortality, achieving gender equality, 
combatting HIV/AIDS and malaria, and aspiring towards universal primary education.42 
However, the World Bank still ranks Ethiopia as one of the poorest countries in the 
world, with between 20 and 30 per cent of the population living in extreme poverty.43 
The urban unemployment rate is estimated at 17, 5 per cent.44 
                                                 
37 Amnesty International (2012). 
38 BBC Somalia profile. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094632 (accessed 27 
January 2015). 
39 Gundel (2002) at 264. 
40 The World Bank “Ethiopia review” (2014). Available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview (accessed 19 January 2015). 
41 World Bank (2014). 
42 World Bank (2014). 
43 World Bank (2014). 
44 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) “About Ethiopia.” Available at 
http://www.et.undp.org/content/ethiopia/en/home/countryinfo/ (accessed 20 January 2015). 
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Ethiopia was traditionally ruled by emperors until the fall of Haile Selassie in 
1974. The country then came under the socialist rule of the Derg regime.  During this 
time civil liberties were repressed and movement outside Ethiopia was restricted. The 
regime, subsequently led by Haile Miriam Mengistu, was overthrown in 1991 by a 
coalition consisting of different ethnic groups, the Ethiopians People Liberation Front 
(EPLF). The flow of Ethiopians in earnest started in 1991 but has increased in recent 
years.45 
Between 1991 and 2000 Ethiopia separated from Eritrea, adopted a constitution, 
conducted the country’s first elections and signed a peace agreement with Eritrea to 
end a bitter conflict.46 The country also suffered catastrophic famines in the mid-1970s 
through to the 1980s. In earlier times, migration was primarily dictated by political 
persecution and conflict. Recently, economic reasons have dictated the movement.47 
Amongst the rural youth, migration is driven by the desire for education, which opens 
new opportunities for personal betterment elsewhere, beyond the rural areas.48 Studies 
have shown that Ethiopian migrants typically spend one to three years in a 
neighbouring country, such as Kenya, before migrating west.49 The growth of an 
economically active population, coupled with conflict, environmental degradation, and 
economic decline, have increased labour and forced migration from Ethiopia to 
countries within the East African Region and beyond. 
4 SITUATION OF SMUGGLED MIGRANTS IN KENYA 
Kenya hosts the largest population of Somali refugees, and is a well-documented 
regional hub for the smuggling of migrants and acquisition of false documentation.50 
Prison facilities in Moyale, Isiolo and Marsabit are reportedly overcrowded because of 
the large number of migrant arrests. Refugee protection and assistance is co-ordinated 
jointly by the UNHCR and the Kenya Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA).  
Until recently, migrant smuggling within the organised crime context had not 
been defined by Kenyan law. In 2011, the Kenya Citizenship Act was enacted and it 
mirrors the definition in the Smuggling Protocol.  Policy makers, civil society and the 
media often refer to the smuggling and trafficking of migrants interchangeably, failing to 
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recognise the mutual exclusivity of the terms. In practice, however, a clear dichotomy 
between the two terms is easily blurred, with smuggling scenarios exhibiting elements 
of trafficking and vice-versa.  The exact number of persons smuggled from Somalia and 
Ethiopia into Kenya is unknown due to the clandestine nature of the movement.  A 
provincial police officer in Kenya’s Mombasa county estimates that about 140 trafficked 
people or smuggled migrants are arrested every week, which brings the annual total to 
about 7 280 arrests.51 An immigration officer reported that between 70 and 100 
irregular migrants are deported every month.52 The Kenyan media frequently report on 
stranded Ethiopians in remote areas, or those harboured in various locations in Nairobi. 
Migrants who have served their sentences for being unlawfully present in Kenya are not 
deported immediately, but may continue to languish in Kenyan prisons for some time 
awaiting repatriation assistance.53 The paucity of data makes it difficult to estimate the 
number of people smuggled, which number would ordinarily be taken into 
consideration in crafting an appropriate response.  
4.1 Smuggling of migrants within the organised crime context in East Africa 
Smuggling networks in the Horn and East Africa have an informal structure.  An IOM 
report on the movement of migrants from Somalia and Ethiopia to Kenya and further 
south has compared the facilitators’ modus operandi to that of courier service providers, 
with slight variations.54 The networks consist of opportunistic individuals, in contrast to 
the hierarchical structure of large organised crime syndicates operating in the West. 
    
Taxi, bus, and lorry drivers, as well as bush guides and those who enter into 
contracts with and accompany migrants on irregular crossings, are all considered 
smugglers because they derive benefit from the movement. The typical smuggler is an 
18- to 40-year-old male of Ethiopian or Somali origin.55 An Ethiopian woman based 
outside Nairobi, and known by immigration officials, has also gained notoriety for being 
part of the smuggling ring.56  
The IOM study found that the linchpin managers in the smuggling chain are 
Somalis who are situated in major East African cities and at key transit points, such as, 
ports, refugee camps or border areas. The managers work with the chief smugglers. 
Typically, they sub-contract transportation, bush guide or facilitator services to local 
pools of opportunistic criminals. The smuggling managers, who are stationed along the 
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smuggling route, play a key role in the smuggling chain and are paid by the chief 
smuggler, who is the principal linchpin, to move a group of people from one point to 
another. The chief smuggler is not necessarily based in the same city.  
The managers are very flexible. They work independently, and offer their 
services to local and chief smugglers across the border. Somali smugglers generally 
work with fellow clansmen throughout the network, and four Ethiopian brothers were 
identified as having spread themselves out along the southern route, defending each 
other’s interests and ensuring control of their network.57  Immigration and police 
officers interviewed in IOM’s study revealed that the smuggling manager’s mobile 
phone is his main tool of trade, as it contains a list of local transporters, compromised 
government officials, managers and chief smugglers in other locations.  
The IOM study compared the human smuggling model in East Africa with the one 
in Mexico, which has been described as the “supermarket” model. Comparatively 
speaking, both models are relatively low cost, have high failure rates at border 
crossings, are characterised by repeated attempts, are run by multiple actors who act 
independently or are loosely affiliated to one another, and do not have a strong 
hierarchy or a violent organisational discipline. Their business is based on the 
capitalistic ideal of maximising profit, and they compete fiercely with each other.  
The smugglers are aware that they are operating unlawfully, and in most 
instances are willing to face the consequences. Where a bribe does not suffice, they will 
most likely pay a modest fine or face deportation. Smuggled migrants are driven to 
Nairobi in lorries fitted with fake bottoms, and they pay between US$600 and US$700 
for the transportation of two undocumented migrants to Nairobi.58 A self-confessed 
Somali smuggler interviewed at a prison in Mombasa said that Somalis are always on 
the run to safety, with Kenya being one of their primary destinations.59 He said that he 
charges US$120 per migrant smuggled and carries up to 120 migrants per trip when 
business is booming. The smuggler owns a boat that brings migrants to the shores of 
Kenya’s Mombasa County. 
The large Ethiopian and Somali diaspora pay a large portion of the smuggling 
expenses through the hawala system.  Hawala is an informal, parallel, international 
money transfer system based on trust. A simple scenario involves A in London 
contacting a hawala dealer (called a hawaladar) X to transfer money to his cousin B in 
Mogadishu. X receives the money to be transferred to B and contacts Y, another 
hawaladar in Mogadishu to give the money to B. B may have to provide a password 
before the money is released to him by Y. Transmitted funds do not necessarily cross 
international borders physically.  X and Y may be in business together or linked via a 
wider network and they will not keep individual transaction records but rather their 
records will reflect the balances of what is owed between the hawaladars. The 
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advantage of the hawala transfer system is that the recipient does not have to prove his 
identity by showing an identity document, which many rural communities across the 
Horn of Africa lack. The sender remains anonymous, which is beneficial for both those 
who overstay their visa time limits, and people in irregular situations, such as irregular 
immigrants in search of employment. The hawala system is fast and cheap, involving no 
more than a telephone call between hawala dealers. Furthermore, transfers to 
recipients take place in urban vicinities as well as in the remotest, rural locations. 
Hawala does not leave a paper trail connecting smugglers to the criminal enterprise. 
Nairobi is a key location for the receipt of smuggling fees and is the Kenyan 
headquarters of the hawala system.60 The Somalis are financed predominantly by the 
diaspora, while a significant number of Ethiopians are funded with the proceeds from 
the sale of private family assets. Characteristic among both communities is that the 
decision to leave home is taken collectively, because it is viewed as an economic 
investment by relatives and clan members.61 Mobile cash transfers are effected through 
the Western Union money transfer system and through Mpesa, a mobile phone cash 
transfer system popularly used in the East African region.  
4.2 Modalities of the movement  
Migrant smuggling from Ethiopia and Somalia generally occurs as mixed migration 
movements. The migrants within these movements comprise refugees, asylum seekers, 
economic migrants, unaccompanied and separated children, and in some instances, 
victims of trafficking. While some of the migrants are destined for Kenya, many of them 
use Kenya as a rest stop while their documents are processed and arrangements are 
made to re-finance their onward journey.62 Smuggled migrants from Addis Ababa in 
Ethiopia are in contact with major smuggling organisers in Nairobi.63 Research and 
press reports have noted that most of the migrants have South Africa in mind as their 
final destination.  
The movement is organised by smugglers in violation of the laws of both transit 
and destination countries. Young, rural, Ethiopian men are actively targeted by 
smugglers, who entice them with a better life elsewhere.64 The smugglers themselves 
are efficient, as Long and Crisp point out: ”Smugglers run well-organized, dynamic 
operations that involve a constantly changing network of collaborators, including 
recruitment agents, truck drivers and transporters, boat owners, providers of forged 
and stolen documents, border guards, immigration and refugee officials, members of the 
police and military”.65  
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Up to 50 Somali smuggling groups are estimated to control the irregular 
migratory route to Southern Africa.66 Alleged corrupt and complicit public officials 
appear to be driving the smuggling of migrants, exacerbating the situation.67 Public 
officials, particularly in the North Eastern Province of Kenya bordering Somalia, have 
been implicated in corruption as a result of the intermediary role they play between 
government offices and migrants in transit.68 A Kenyan police officer interviewed for 
the IOM study stated that the extent of public officials’ collusion with smugglers implies 
that they play an integral part in the illegal and abusive enterprise.69 On the Somali side 
of the Kenya-Somali border, at Dobley, a network of smugglers offers young men a more 
attractive option than the Daadab refugee camp.70 
Most Somalis do not have a recognised valid passport to facilitate regular travel. 
Instead, they travel by boat from Mogadishu and Kismayo to Mombasa, Kenya.71 Vessels 
from Kismayo bring dried fish and human cargo to the old ports in Mombasa, Kilifi and 
Lamu, and to the unregulated ports along the north coast. Migrants are transported in 
small, overloaded boats exposed to the elements. To travel from Mombasa, they often 
wait long periods for promised transport or a guide. Some are transported to Shimoni, 
from where they are transported to Tanzania by boat, en-route to South Africa. Bribes 
smooth things over with the authorities at Shimoni. Immigration officers claim they are 
ill-equipped to intercept the movement along the 110km coastline from Likoni to Vanga, 
which has an estimated 176 illegal entry points.  
Brokers assist in the smuggling of Somalis directly from Mogadishu to Nairobi, or 
via Nairobi to South Africa. They enter Kenya by four-wheel drive vehicles or lorry, via 
Dhobley, close to Kenya’s Liboi border with Somalia. The migrants who opt for this 
passage have a legitimate claim to asylum. They are granted prima facie refugee status 
in Kenya, and use the services of smugglers as the only means of obtaining protection. 
Mass movements resulting from generalised violence diminish the capabilities of 
authorities to conduct individualised refugee status determination processes. As a 
result, and because of valid reasons for fleeing, mass population displacements may be 
granted prima facie status by host governments. The largest community of Somalis in 
Kenya, after Dadaab refugee camp, resides in Eastleigh, in Nairobi, which has an 
unsurprisingly large network of smugglers and their agents. 
Despite the existence of a bilateral agreement between Kenya and Ethiopia in 
terms of which the citizens of each country have freedom of movement and the right to 
carry on trade in the territory of the other, Ethiopians travelling by bus, truck, or on 
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foot, are required to pay bribes to Moyale border immigration officers through brokers, 
regardless of the status of their documentation.72 The bribe is between US$250 and 
US$450 for a travel stamp. The profits from this activity are shared among government 
officials in Moyale and with the provincial headquarters in Garissa. There are Ethiopian 
migrants who travel through the bush to avoid paying the corrupt passage fee. On being 
intercepted, they are heavily extorted. Smuggled migrants are also required to pay 
bribes at road blocks on the journey to Nairobi.  
Ethiopians travel from Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, by road, through the Moyale 
border in Kenya, to Nairobi, and may proceed to the Mombasa or Namanga borders with 
Tanzania for their onward journey south. Moyale is a major nexus for smuggling and 60 
per cent of the town’s income is said to be derived from the business. As noted in the 
East Africa Standard: 
Ethiopians get into Kenya through Moyale, Dukana and Forolle in North Horr, Bute in 
Wajir North and Takaba in Mandera West. However, most of them connect to Isiolo from 
Moyale using cattle trucks passing through Merti to avoid arrest. This is a big business 
and it is very difficult to fight the cartels, some that operate in Ethiopia and South Africa. 
But we are liaising with the Immigration Department to see how we can beat them.73  
In December 2010, the town of Isiolo recorded more than 300 arrests of Ethiopian and 
Somali migrants. Stricter surveillance in Garissa has made smugglers turn to the Isiolo 
route to prevent detection. 
Mandera, the farthest corner in North Eastern Kenya, is a gateway for many 
Somalis coming through Kenya. Similar accounts of bribery, extortion and complicity of 
public officials in the smuggling of migrants through Mandera abound. A tribal chief 
interviewed in the IOM study confirmed that human trafficking is a big business in 
Mandera, to the extent that its interception could trigger a clan war.74 Persistent 
terrorist attacks in the Northern frontier in the last couple of years have, however, 
increased surveillance and security in those regions as well as corrupt practices.  In 
addition, the Kenya Defence Forces have been deployed to border areas to reinforce 
security. 
4.3 Linking the causal factors to the movement 
The most obvious reason for Somalis leaving their country is violence brought about by 
the political situation. In 2011, increased fighting between government forces and two 
Islamist groups, Hisbul Islam and al Shabaab, coupled with a crippling drought situation, 
gave rise to an unprecedented movement of Somalis from the south and central region 
into Kenya and surrounding countries.  
Somalis also move to escape personal persecution as a result of their political 
affiliation, clan membership and gender.  Their departure is also prompted by their 
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desire to evade forced conscription, and the search for basic commodities such as, food, 
medical services, healthcare and more viable livelihoods.75 The 2009 research report 
commissioned by the IOM revealed that war and insecurity was the number one reason 
for the exodus from Somalia, followed by unemployment and poverty.76 The situation in 
2015 remains largely unchanged. 
Even though Ethiopia has not experienced Somalia’s level of violence, political 
oppression and economic stagnation have impelled a mass exodus from the southern 
part of the country.  The Oromo people in the south and south east of the country have 
felt the unwelcome winds of political oppression and economic marginalisation, driving 
them to leave the country.77 Avoiding recruitment, and desertion from the army have 
also pressed many young men to leave Ethiopia.  
However, at the centre of these departures remains the search for a better life, 
spurred by the perceived prosperity of neighbours whose sons have already moved 
away.78 In the IOM report, over half of the respondents stated that they had left their 
homes because of unemployment.79 Respondents also cited the pursuit of greener 
pastures due to poverty, insecurity and war. 
4.4 Deleterious effects on the countries of origin and destination 
Migrant smuggling indicates the existence of corrupt networks consisting of 
government officials and private citizens involved in bribery and extortion.  The issue is 
much more broadly linked to issues of good governance, state transparency and 
accountability.80 Migrant smuggling is a profitable, illicit business whose proceeds are 
untaxed and may be used to fund other criminal activities. The hawala system has been 
found to be used to transmit most of the illicit proceeds from smuggling activities, thus 
ensuring that there is no paper trail. Hundreds of migrants continue to die of suffocation 
and other abuses during the perilous journey. The youth, a valuable human resource for 
any country, are being wasted in the case of Somalia and Ethiopia. Recently, irregular 
movement within the Horn of Africa and the surrounding region has sparked renewed 
fears that terrorist elements are taking advantage of a lax border security environment 
to launch deadly attacks in Kenya and promote an extremist ideology among the youth.  
4.5 East Africa’s and Horn of Africa’s response to the smuggling of 
migrants 
The East African Community (EAC) Common Market Protocol signed by the respective 
countries’ heads of state entered into force on 1 July 2010. This Protocol envisages free 
movement among citizens in the East African region. The EAC is exploring prospects of 
South Sudan joining the Community, and Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia 
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and Somalia have recently also expressed their interest in joining it. Integrating a 
displacement framework into the EAC free movement regime may contribute to 
enhancing migration management in the region.  
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Regional Consultative 
Process (RCP) on Migration held its first meeting in 2010 and subsequent meetings in 
2012 and 2013 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The IGAD-RCP was established in 2009 to 
facilitate regional dialogue on migration issues among IGAD Member States, and seeks 
to promote the 2006 African Union (AU) Migration Policy Framework. The Framework 
provides policy guidance on various thematic issues including irregular migration, 
forced displacement and the human rights of migrants.   Both Ethiopia and Somalia are 
IGAD Member States and part of the RCP.  
In 2010 a Regional Conference on the theme Refugee Protection and International 
Migration: Mixed Movements and Irregular Migration from the East and Horn of Africa to 
Southern Africa, was held to encourage constructive discussion among states and other 
stakeholders on the problem regarding the mixed movement of people southwards. 
Participants from Ethiopia and Somalia were among the attendees. The conference 
discussed migrants’ rights, enhanced legal migration alternatives and border migration. 
An action plan was adopted, addressing legislation, capacity building, outreach, 
cooperation, data collection and operations. A Joint Commission Meeting for Technical 
Co-operation between Kenya and Tanzania agreed to enhance co-operation to control 
smugglers and to curb irregular migration.81  
The IOM has also established a Regional Committee on Mixed Migration for the Horn 
of Africa and Yemen to facilitate the co-ordination of government actions in addressing 
cross-border movements. The Committee held its fourth meeting in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, at the end of October 2014. Representatives from Somalia and Kenya were 
present. There may be a need to consolidate the above initiatives into a coherent 
regional policy, guided by the AU Migration Policy Framework, towards enhanced 
efficacy in addressing irregular movement, and enhancing protection for migrants in the 
Horn of Africa and surrounding region.  
5 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK ON MIGRANT SMUGGLING 
A legislative response to the smuggling of migrants should encompass prevention, 
protection, prosecution and co-operation, all of which will be discussed below. Such a 
response needs to be guided by human rights standards as well as by refugee and 
humanitarian law. The primary international legal instruments and customary law 
principles propagating these tenets are discussed below insofar as they relate to the 
treatment of smuggled migrants.  
The Smuggling Protocol, which supplements the UNTOC, aims to decriminalise 
the smuggled migrant and to criminalise the financiers and profiteers of the smuggling 
process.  The UNTOC, on the other hand, broadly addresses trafficking of women and 
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children, the smuggling of migrants, and the manufacture of, and traffic, in illicit 
firearms.82   The UNTOC seeks to promote co-operation and prevention, and to combat 
transnational organised crime. 83  These objectives are aimed at addressing conduct 
criminalised pursuant to its Article 3. The criminalised conduct includes: participation 
in an organised criminal group; laundering of the proceeds of crime; corruption; 
obstruction of justice; and serious crime.  Article 2 of the UNTOC defines a serious crime 
as an offence which carries a penalty of four or more years’ imprisonment. The 
criminalised conduct must be of a transnational nature, and must involve an organised 
criminal group.84 The criminalised conduct under the UNTOC is implicit in the 
smuggling of migrants.  
The Smuggling Protocol should be read together with the UNTOC.85 In this 
regard, ratification of the Protocol is conditional upon the accession of a state party to 
the UNTOC.86 The Smuggling Protocol was necessitated by the call for a comprehensive 
instrument to address the smuggling of migrants in the light of the involvement of 
increasingly organised groups. Its purposes are: to prevent and combat the smuggling of 
persons; to protect the rights of migrants; to promote cooperation and information 
exchange; and to address the root causes of smuggling.87  
The Smuggling Protocol has been criticised for placing little emphasis on 
responding to the root causes of smuggling. It alludes to root causes in its Preamble and 
Article 15 (3), which addresses development programmes and co-operation.88 The 
Smuggling Protocol has also been described as a law enforcement instrument, as 
opposed to a human rights instrument. Despite its focus on prosecution and 
criminalisation of the various facets of smuggling, the UNODC adopts the position that 
the Smuggling Protocol’s provisions mandate the protection of smuggled migrants. 
Indeed, the Preamble to the Protocol and its Articles 2, 4, 14(1), 14 (2), 16 and 19 
provide for the protection of smuggled migrants.89 Thus, UNODC encourages countries 
to adopt a human rights-based approach when implementing the Protocol.90 
5.1 Prevention 
States parties to the UNTOC are advised to adopt appropriate legislative and 
administrative measures to prevent transnational organised crime.91 Part III of the 
Protocol provides for prevention, co-operation and other measures. The measures 
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should address public awareness, enhanced border control, documentation integrity, 
and development programmes. The ideal preventative starting point would be to 
eliminate the main “push” factor, which is the violent political turmoil prevalent in 
Somalia. This may not be immediately achievable. A more realistic goal is to combat 
corruption amongst some Kenyan immigration officials and police who facilitate 
unlawful entry of persons into the country. The fight against corruption should embrace 
measures ranging over rigorous screening procedures for recruiting public officials, 
anti-corruption training for key functionaries, inspections and audits, whistleblowing, 
and prompt investigation and prosecution of alleged incidence of corruption.92 
Furthermore, Kenyan criminal justice authorities need to make use of the anti-money 
laundering and prevention of organised crime laws to target the proceeds of economic 
crime. Public prosecutors need to target especially the ill-gotten assets derived from 
migrant smuggling. A concrete way of doing this is to resort to civil asset recovery 
procedures, which do not require the presence of the accused in court and where the 
standard of proof required for a court order to be issued is less than that required to 
secure a criminal conviction. This means that the proceeds of the crime may be attached 
without a criminal conviction. Hitting the criminal in the pocket, where it hurts most, is 
a strong deterrent and preventive measure. 
5.1.1 Public awareness  
Public awareness is aimed at addressing the existence, causes, gravity and threat of 
transnational organised crime.93 It is envisaged that such measures will deter migrants 
from submitting themselves to the smuggling process. Effective public awareness 
requires substantial funding, which is rarely made readily available by the governments 
of Kenya, Somalia or Ethiopia. The efficacy of awareness raising campaigns is also 
difficult to gauge, particularly where it targets vulnerable populations that lack 
alternatives. 
5.1.2 Border control measures 
Article 11 of the Smuggling Protocol requires states to enhance border protection 
measures to prevent and detect smuggling. The Kenya-Somalia and Kenya-Ethiopia 
borders are both long and porous. In order to curb irregular migration, the Kenyan 
Immigration Department has introduced a mobile truck unit to police the Kenya-
Somalia border better. 
5.1.3 Document integrity 
The travel documents should be of such quality as not to be easily misused, altered, or 
duplicated.94 The Smuggling Protocol recommends the prohibition of commercial 
carriers from engaging in migrant smuggling. Carriers are responsible for confirming 
the integrity of travel documentation and must be punished if passengers contravene 
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entry requirements.  In extreme situations states may withdraw the carrier’s licence. 
States need to deny entry to, or withdraw the visas of, persons implicated in smuggling 
of migrants. States parties are required to clarify questions on document integrity 
without delay in suspected cases of smuggling.95 
 In practice, the smuggling of persons from the Horn of Africa to South Africa 
does not rely on travel documentation, and there is less use of commercial carriers 
because of the high risk of detection. 
5.1.4 Development programmes 
The socioeconomic circumstances of the countries of origin, namely Ethiopia and 
Somalia, constitute a major push factor for migrants. Article 15 (3) of the Smuggling 
Protocol requires states parties to implement appropriate development programmes to 
address the root causes of irregular migration. Improving the socioeconomic 
circumstances of migrants would eradicate a major push factor. However, where such 
measures are implemented, they are unlikely to yield results immediately. Cooperation, 
both financial and technical, is indispensable for actualising such development 
programmes. 
5.2 Protection and assistance 
5.2.1 Witness protection 
Smuggled migrants are privy to valuable information pertaining to the smuggling 
process. They are likely to be aware of the persons involved, the routes utilised and the 
corrupt officials and non-state actors who facilitate the movement. As a result, they can 
be subject to reprisals by their smugglers, especially if they co-operate with law 
enforcement agencies, as envisaged under Article 26 of the UNTOC. Articles 24 and 25 of 
the UNTOC provide for the protection of victims and witnesses and Articles 16(2) and 
(3) provide for the protection of smuggled migrants from violence, and assistance 
where their lives are at risk. 
5.2.1 Human rights 
Smuggled migrants are human beings first. Appropriate measures should be put in place 
by states parties to the Smuggling Protocol for the protection of, and assistance to, 
smuggled migrants. Their fundamental rights and freedoms are guaranteed in the 
preamble to the Protocol, which reiterates the right to life, and the right not to be 
subjected to torture, or inhumane or degrading treatment.96 Detention, Kenya’s most 
common way of dealing with smuggled migrants should be a last resort.97 Where 
detained, migrants should be allowed to have access to their respective countries’ 
consular services.98 Women and children are vulnerable to sexual and physical abuse 
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during the smuggling process. The Smuggling Protocol recommends that states parties 
make special provision for giving assistance to this vulnerable group. Provision is also 
made with regard to entry onto vessels on the high seas. The integrity of and the lives, 
and cargo, aboard the vessel must be preserved.99 
5.2.2 Assisted voluntary return 
Ideally, the return of smuggled migrants should be voluntary, but this is mostly 
untenable because there are minimal legal channels to normalise their stay in Kenya, 
and the Smuggling Protocol does not compel states parties to facilitate their return. In 
the case of returning migrants, states parties must verify the nationality of smuggled 
persons and issue them with documents to facilitate their return.100 States must ensure 
that return takes place in an orderly and dignified way. The Smuggling Protocol 
contains minimum standards, and states parties should facilitate the humane return of 
smuggled migrants through negotiated bilateral agreements.  
5.2.3 Refugees and asylum seekers 
Refugees and asylum seekers benefit from international protection pursuant to the 
1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, and the now customary law principle of 
non-refoulement.101 In recognition of their right to international protection refugees and 
asylum seekers are excluded from the provisions of the Smuggling Protocol.102 They 
should not be discriminated against for being part of the mixed migration movement. 
6   PROSECUTION AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
The UNTOC requires the criminalisation of organised criminal activity, money 
laundering, corruption and obstruction of justice in order to promote uniformity in the 
laws of states parties and to enhance cross border co-operation.103 Migrant smuggling is 
a predicate offence for the crimes of money laundering and terrorism, which means it is 
an offence, the proceeds of which could be used to commit the crime of money 
laundering or to finance terrorism. Corruption, on the other hand, facilitates smuggling. 
Furthermore, it obstructs the administration of justice, thus undermining efforts to 
prosecute smugglers.104   Offences aimed at criminalising the smuggling of migrants at 
the domestic level may be established independently of the involvement of an organised 
criminal group. Criminal, civil or administrative liability, including monetary sanctions, 
should be imposed for both natural and legal persons.105 An effective response to the 
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smuggling of migrants requires co-operation among law enforcement agencies across 
states parties.106   
The Smuggling Protocol criminalises the smuggling of migrants.107 It provides for 
the prevention of smuggling, protection of smuggled migrants and cooperation among 
states parties. The smuggled migrant should not be criminalised for being part of the 
smuggling conduct.108 However, countries maintain their sovereign right to prosecute 
irregular entry.  
6.1   Offences and the elements of the crime 
Article 6 of the Smuggling Protocol criminalises the following: smuggling of migrants; 
production of a fraudulent travel or identity documents; procurement, provision, or 
possession of a fraudulent travel or identity document; and the enabling of illegal 
residency. Liability for the offences must extend to attempts, accomplices, as well as to 
organisers and persons giving directions. Aggravating circumstances should apply for 
all the listed offences where circumstances endanger the life and safety of migrants or 
entail inhuman or degrading treatment, including the exploitation of migrants.  
The UNODC has suggested additional offences under Article 6 as long as they 
conform to the legal system of a states party.109 Two considerations should be borne in 
mind by the appropriate prosecution authorities before instituting a prosecution on the 
basis of the suggested offences. First, the state should be able to prove the offence and 
not merely burden the accused with the charge. Secondly, care must be taken not to 
deviate too far from the primary offence.  
The prosecutor must prove that the accused facilitated or assisted in the 
smuggling and that this was done for profit. The mental element consists, therefore, in 
the intention to obtain a financial or material benefit.110 The material elements of the 
offence are that there is a financial or material benefit accruing to the accused; and that 
the accused procured the illegal entry or stay, which involves the voluntary crossing of a 
border into a state of which the person is neither a national nor a permanent 
resident.111 Persons who deal with migrants other than for profit should not be held 
liable for the offence of migrant smuggling.  
 
 
                                                 
106 Art 26 of the UNTOC. 
107 Art 6 of the Smuggling Protocol. 
108 Art 5 of the Smuggling Protocol. 
109 Price M &  McAdam M Basic training manual on investigating and prosecuting the smuggling of 
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7   JURISDICTION 
States parties are required to enact laws that will facilitate the prosecution of 
perpetrators present on their territory who have committed any of the offences listed 
under the UNTOC. Where parallel investigations are being conducted by one or two 
states parties, Article 15 (5) requires the competent authorities of those states parties 
to co-ordinate their investigative efforts. 
8   INTERNATIONAL REGIONAL COOPERATION 
The UNTOC is an instrument of co-operation. It seeks to promote uniformity among 
states parties in combating the offences that it creates, and Article 27 provides for 
cooperation among law enforcement authorities. Co-operation is envisaged in the 
confiscation of the proceeds of crime, extradition with or without an extradition treaty, 
transfer of sentenced persons, and mutual legal assistance.112 States parties are 
required to co-operate with developing countries and countries with transitional 
economies in order to enhance their financial, material and technical capacity to combat 
transnational organised crime.113 
Part II, Article 7, of the Smuggling Protocol addresses the smuggling of migrants 
by sea, and provides for co-operation among states parties to prevent and suppress the 
smuggling of migrants pursuant to the international law of the sea. States parties with 
common borders, or through which the migrant smuggling routes pass, are encouraged 
to share information to achieve the Smuggling Protocol’s aims. Information exchanged 
may include information relating to routes, carriers, and the identity and modalities of 
organised criminal groups. The exchange of information can also include legislative 
practices and technical information to assist law enforcement authorities to address 
migrant smuggling. A state party can classify information shared as confidential. Article 
11(6) requires states parties to consider the establishment and maintenance of direct 
channels of communication among border control agencies. 
The Smuggling Protocol envisages co-operation in training immigration officers 
to prevent and combat the smuggling of migrants;114 to promote the humane treatment 
of migrants; to improve detection mechanisms and intelligence gathering on the 
modalities of the crime; to enhance fraudulent identity document detection; and to 
improve the security and quality of travel documents.  A critical omission is capacity 
building in the identification of smuggled migrants, despite such recommendation 
during negotiations.115 The importance of identifying smuggled migrants is elaborated 
below.  States parties are required to consider entering into bilateral, regional, and 
operational agreements as means of enhancing the provisions of the Smuggling 
Protocol.116 
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8.1 Shortcomings of the Protocol 
Before evaluating Kenya’s’ implementation of the Smuggling Protocol, it is important to 
highlight some of the instrument’s shortcomings.117 First, the Protocol is an 
international co-operation agreement that addresses the organised context of 
smuggling, as opposed to a human rights treaty advocating for the rights of smuggled 
migrants. The protection mechanisms, especially as they relate to children, are 
insufficient. Mechanisms to identify smuggled migrants are not elaborated, and assisted 
return for smuggled migrants is not guaranteed by the state party of which they are 
nationals.  
Lack of mechanisms to identify smuggled migrants, such as, the absence of 
procedures to identify fraudulent travel or identity documents, the lack of X-ray 
scanners and surveillance cameras, and laxity in developing risk profiles of smugglers 
and smuggled persons, are obviously problematic for numerous reasons.  First, the state 
party which has custody of the smuggled migrants is unable to elicit important 
information from the migrant on the intricacies of the criminal activity. Secondly, the 
UNTOC creates weightier obligations with regard to the protection of victims of 
trafficking than the Smuggling Protocol does for smuggled migrants. It can be argued 
that it would be more advantageous for a state party to classify a victim of trafficking as 
a smuggled migrant, as a means of evading the necessary protection and assistance 
modalities required for trafficked migrants. 
The Smuggling Protocol also fails to recognise the distinction and practical 
overlap between trafficked and smuggled persons.118 Smuggled migrants can, and often 
do, morph into victims of trafficking. The UNTOC categorises trafficked persons as 
victims while the status of smuggled migrants is not defined so clearly. Article 5 of the 
Smuggling Protocol recommends that smuggled migrants should not be criminalised 
merely for being part of the smuggling conduct. However, Article 6 (4) of the Protocol, 
allows states parties to prosecute migrants for contravening legally established entry 
requirements. Hitherto, states parties have concentrated on prosecuting smuggled 
migrants. Some states parties assist migrants based on their consent to co-operate with 
the law enforcement authorities. The lack of co-operation results in prosecution for 
illegal entry, while cooperation allows for exemption from prosecution. Articles 5 and 6 
(4) may prejudice the smuggled migrant’s position by requiring them to co-operate with 
law enforcement or face prosecution for illegal entry. 
On a positive note, Article 19 excludes refugees and asylum seekers from the 
provisions of the Smuggling Protocol. This category of migrants has to rely frequently 
on smugglers for their conveyance to safety.   
9 KENYAN NATIONAL LAWS ON MIGRANT SMUGGLING 
The presence of smuggled migrants within a country in large numbers causes unease 
within governments and among citizens. Governments look to their compromised 
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national security systems, while citizens grumble that migrants take their jobs and 
opportunities to do business. The primary concern for any government and citizen 
should be that the infiltration of smuggled migrants into the country is indicative of the 
proliferation of organised criminal elements.  
Ideally, migrant smuggling should not be addressed under national immigration 
laws. The Smuggling Protocol addresses migrant smuggling occurring within an 
organised criminal context. An individual migrant who deliberately avoids immigration 
procedures and who crosses into Kenya from Ethiopia on his own is not subject to the 
Smuggling Protocol, but may be liable for illegal entry under Kenya’s immigration laws.  
Efforts to assess Kenya’s implementation of the Smuggling Protocol must consider 
domestic measures put in place to give effect to the UNTOC. Consequentially, Kenya’s 
legal arrangements for the treatment of smuggled migrants will be assessed in 
association with the immigration laws, which at present contain the bulk of the 
regulations governing migrant smuggling. 
9.1.  Kenya’s procedural and legislative response 
Until the present day, the modus operandi adopted to address the smuggling of migrants 
has been of a summary nature.  Migrants intercepted during the smuggling process are 
arraigned before subordinate courts by immigration officers vested with prosecutorial 
powers.  They are then charged with being “unlawfully present” in Kenya. The accused 
invariably plead guilty to the offence and are fined or sentenced to not more than 12 
months’ imprisonment in lieu of a fine. This sentence is accompanied by a repatriation 
order which comes into effect once the prison sentence has been served. The Kenyan 
Penal Code, read together with the Immigration Act (now repealed), provides the 
impetus for the repatriation order.119 The relevant provision states that where a person 
is convicted of an offence punishable by imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
twelve months, a court may order that the person be removed from Kenya, immediately 
or on completion of any sentence of imprisonment. 
The Kenyan police have been criticised for their obsession with arresting 
arriving Somalis and charging them or threatening to charge them with being present in 
Kenya unlawfully.120 Threats by police are aimed at extorting bribes from the migrants. 
Police stationed in the vicinity of the Liboi border area extort money from thousands of 
Somali asylum seekers who cross the border in vehicles with the help of smugglers.121  
In the unreported case of R v Hussein Galgalo and two others122, the accused persons of 
Somali origin were charged with being in Kenya unlawfully, in violation of section 13 
(2) of the Immigration Act (now repealed). They were found guilty and subsequently 
sentenced to six months’ imprisonment, after which they were subject to repatriation. A 
                                                 
119 Penal Code, s 26 A.  
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judicial review of the decision set aside the conviction on the ground that the plea was 
administered improperly, apart from the fact that the accused persons were not 
provided with an interpreter during the trial. This case is illustrative of the treatment 
meted out to smuggled migrants in Kenya when they are intercepted by law 
enforcement officials.  
Until the recent enactment of the Kenya Immigration and Citizenship Act,123  law 
enforcement officials were in a quandary as to the appropriate offences with which to 
charge the facilitators and profiteers of human smuggling. Currently, the treatment of 
smuggled migrants is still reminiscent of the now repealed, archaic 1967 Immigration 
Act. In the Mohamed Sirajesh Mohamed case,124 the accused, a Somali national, was 
found without travel documents after the public transport vehicle in which he found 
himself, was intercepted at a road block about 60 kilometres from Nairobi. The accused 
was charged in the Senior Resident Magistrates’ Court at Kajiado on 7 November 2011 
with offences under sections 53 (1) and (2) of the Citizenship Act. He pleaded guilty and 
on this plea was liable to a fine of Kenyan Shillings ( Kshs) 200 000 or 12 months 
imprisonment in lieu of the fine. The court issued an additional order that he be 
repatriated.  As a result of the intervention of the UNHCR, acting through a legal aid 
organisation, Kituo cha Sheria, the repatriation order was substituted by an order that 
Mohamed be handed over to the UNHCR as a person of concern. 
9.2 Laws against organised crime  
9.2.1 Prevention of Organised Crimes Act of 2010 
The Prevention of Organised Crimes Act is a national law aimed at the prevention and 
punishment of organised crime and the recovery of the proceeds of organised crime.125 
It came into force on 23 November 2010 and domesticates the UNTOC. The Act 
criminalises organised criminal activities and the obstruction of justice. It also provides 
for the tracing, confiscation, seizure and forfeiture of property.  This law mirrors the 
UNTOC in defining an organised criminal group. However, under the Act, a serious 
crime is any offence punishable by a prison term of at least six months, pursuant to the 
Laws of Kenya, as opposed to the four years’ imprisonment that qualify an offence as a 
serious crime under the UNTOC.126  
An additional proviso to the serious crime definition under the Prevention of 
Organised Crimes Act 6 of 2010 is dual criminality. Where criminal conduct committed 
in a foreign jurisdiction is also criminalised under the Laws of Kenya, such conduct 
constitutes a serious crime.  A serious crime under Section 2 of the Act is a felony. 
However, Chapter 63 of the Penal Code classifies an offence punishable by six months 
imprisonment or less as a misdemeanour. This creates a conflict.   
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According to the Act, participation in an organised criminal activity is proscribed. 
The penalty is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 15 years , or a fine not exceeding 
Kshs 5 million, (approximately US$59 600) or both. A person is deemed to engage in 
organised criminal activity where such a person: is a member of an organised criminal 
group; recruits members; acts in concert with other persons in committing a serious 
offence for profit; uses his or her membership to direct the commission of a serious 
offence; or threatens violence or retaliation in connection with the organised criminal 
group, amongst other activities.127 
The Prevention of Organised Crimes Act was enacted to stem the increase in the 
incidence of kidnapping and the extortion of ransoms and drug trafficking, the criminal 
activities of the al Qaeda linked terrorist group al Shabaab, and to combat the criminal 
activities of the outlawed Mungiki sect, which is a banned ethnic organisation.128  The 
provisions of section 3, read together with section 4, can be used to address the 
smuggling of migrants. Similarities between offences in the Act and Article 6 of the 
Smuggling Protocol include: aggravated circumstances resulting from organised 
criminal activity; membership of an organised criminal group; conduct related to 
document fraud; retaliation or violence against smuggled migrants; and attempting or 
aiding and abetting any of the above offences. 
In determining whether someone is a member of an organised criminal group, 
the court needs to consider the person’s own admission, the reasonable circumstances 
pointing to membership, visible affiliation with an organised criminal group, and receipt 
of financial or material benefit from such group.129 
The ambit of the Prevention of Organised Crimes Act is narrower than that of the 
UNTOC, which it seeks to domesticate. The Act does not provide for the protection of 
victims, as proposed during debate after the Bill’s second reading.130 The law’s 
connection with trafficking in persons as an organised crime was recognised, but no 
similar correlation was drawn with regard to the smuggling of migrants. During the 
debate, it was further noted that the provisions of the UNTOC were not adequately 
addressed by the debated draft. The draft was nevertheless more or less passed in that 
form. As such, it leaves gaps in crafting an appropriate response to the progressively 
sophisticated mechanisms and modalities of organised crime, including the smuggling 
of migrants, which it does not consider directly.131   
9.2.2 Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2009 
The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (the Proceeds of Crime Act) was 
enacted in 2009 to criminalise money laundering. The Act provides for the combating of 
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the crime as well as the identification, tracing, freezing, seizure and confiscation of the 
proceeds of crime.132 The Act makes all crimes predicate offences.133 During the second 
reading of the Bill, the Minster for Finance highlighted smuggling and prostitution rings 
as examples of offences where large amounts of illegal proceeds are generated and 
laundered to enable criminals to enjoy their ill-gotten gains.134  In this regard, where a 
smuggling related offence is committed under the Prevention of Organised Crimes Act, 
then it follows that the proceeds of this offence, where they are disguised or there is an 
attempt to disguise them, should fall under the Proceeds of Crime Act. Section 2 defines 
proceeds of crime as any property or economic advantage realised in connection with 
an offence, including property that is converted or transformed successfully, as well as 
economic gains realised from that property from the time the offence was committed.  
 Sections 3, 4 and 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act establish the offence of money 
laundering. Money laundering occurs where a person knowingly deals with the 
proceeds of crime in order to conceal their nature, source, location, disposition 
movement or ownership; enables another person who commits an offence to avoid 
prosecution;  removes or diminishes any property realized from the commission of an 
offence; knowingly acquires, uses, or has possession of property that constitutes the 
whole or part of the proceeds of an offence; and transmits and receives a monetary 
instrument with the intention of committing an offence.135 
Penalties are provided in section 16. Natural persons are liable to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding 14 years, and/or a fine not exceeding Kshs 5 million. Where the 
value of the property laundered exceeds the value of the fine, the amount of the fine 
shall be commensurate with the value of the property. In the case of corporate bodies, 
they shall be liable to a fine not exceeding Kshs 25 million or the value of the property 
laundered, whichever is higher.  
The Proceeds of Crime Act is not without controversy. It is linked to the 
International Money Laundering Abetment and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act of 2001, 
Act 3 of the dreaded American US Patriot Act, which contains radical measures to 
combat the financing of terrorism.136During debate, the Bill was criticised for being 
contextually misplaced in a country whose economy is primarily cash-based, with little 
data or consumer protection safeguards.137 
9.1.3 Mutual Legal Assistance Act 2011 
The Mutual Legal Assistance Act of 2011 governs situations in which a relevant 
agreement for mutual legal assistance exists, as well as where it does not. It does not 
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preclude agreements or arrangements in respect of cooperation between Kenya, other 
States and international entities on legal assistance, and allows broader assistance than 
may be provided for in an agreement.138 Specific requests for assistance directed to 
Kenya may relate to the examination and attendance of witnesses, service of documents, 
provision or production of records, and lending of exhibits, among others.139 Broadly 
speaking, it may constitute a basis for co-operation in information gathering and 
investigation of the transnational organized movement of migrants from the Horn of 
Africa and beyond. 
10 IMMIGRATION AND PENAL LAWS 
10.1 The Citizenship and Immigration Act of 2011 
Section 2 of the Citizenship Act mirrors the Smuggling Protocol definition of migrant 
smuggling, except that migrant smuggling under the Citizenship Act applies to both 
illegal entry and exit. Trafficking in persons is also defined in section 2 of the Citizenship 
Act by way of cross-referencing the Counter Trafficking in Persons Act of 2010, which 
largely adopted the definition in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons. According to the Citizenship Act, a smuggled migrant is a victim 
of a crime. Internationally, the smuggled migrant is not recognised as a victim because 
he/she consents to being smuggled.  However, the harsh realities of the smuggling 
process often leave the migrant a victim of one crime or another. The Citizenship Act 
exempts smuggled migrants who are employed irregularly in Kenya from prosecution, 
provided that they are willing to assist in the prosecution of the smuggler.140 
In addition to defining the offence of migrant smuggling, the Citizenship Act 
defines other related organised criminal offences. It makes provision for the 
punishment of carriers engaged in the smuggling of migrants, as recommended by the 
Smuggling Protocol. However, the smuggled migrant is not exempted from criminal 
prosecution as required by the Smuggling Protocol. Numerous document-related 
offences, including harbouring and interfering with the duties of an immigration officer, 
either through misrepresentation or exerting undue influence, are enumerated in the 
Citizenship Act. Many of the offences can be used to prosecute smugglers.  The 
Citizenship Act recognises the right of entry of refugees and asylum seekers, and 
provides for holding facilities for persons of concern to immigration officers. Such 
facilities can provide temporary shelter and access to basic amenities for smuggled 
migrants who have suffered abuse during their journey.  
The Citizenship Act represents the first attempt by the Kenyan legislature to 
encapsulate the offence of migrant smuggling. However, it is not recommended as an 
international best practice to include smuggling and related offences in domestic 
immigration law. The offence of smuggling should be dealt with separately under the 
organised crime framework of a state party. 
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 The possible complicity of immigration and law enforcement officers, which 
occurs in many cases of smuggling, is not directly considered in the Citizenship Act. In 
sum, the Citizenship Act does not provide adequately for the protection of smuggled 
migrants, the prevention of smuggling, or co-operation among relevant actors and 
states, which is essential in combating and addressing the smuggling of migrants. 
However, all the statutes discussed above can be utilised by law enforcement 
authorities to prosecute various facets of the smuggling offence. 
11 RECOMMENDATIONS  
The tide of migration from the Horn of Africa southwards is not diminishing. It is likely 
to continue, mutating into more sophisticated methods aimed at preventing detection. 
Additionally, opportunistic criminals will continue to scuffle for the spoils of the 
irregular movement of people across borders.  An isolated response by Ethiopia, 
Somalia and Kenya would be too narrow and simplistic for such a complex migratory 
phenomenon. However, given the centrality of Kenya to the migrant movement, a 
coalition of interventions by these three countries may actually hold the key to 
stemming the movement southwards. At the very least, a co-ordinated response to the 
three countries may succeed in sealing corruption loopholes, or harnessing some sort of 
economic gain from the movement for the countries involved. 
11.1 Prevention 
A logical starting point would be to address the root causes of the irregular movement. 
This can be done only in collaboration with the countries of origin. All the governments 
involved need to provide for the required interventions to address root causes in their 
long-term development plans, in tandem with apportioning adequate budgetary 
allocations. As regards Somalia,   the making of such budgetary provisions should be 
considered among other national priorities as the nation strives to re-build itself. For 
Ethiopia, with its state led, five-year Growth and Transformation Plan well underway, 
the time to act is now.  
Kenya, as a country of transit and destination, in collaboration with the countries 
of origin, should try to isolate the economic advantage deeply embedded in this 
movement. Ethiopia and Somalia both possess a large pool of human resources by 
virtue of their youthful and energetic populations. Keeping the youthful population 
economically engaged, despite strained economic circumstances, is not a problem 
unique to Ethiopia and Somalia. Kenya, South Africa and most developing countries are 
privy to this dilemma. 
Kenya has implemented a “Kazi kwa Vijana” (work for young people) and youth 
labour export programmes which are aimed at providing the youth with work 
opportunities locally and abroad. The philosophical basis of the programmes is that 
foreign labour markets can benefit from Kenya’s many skilled and unskilled human 
resources. South Africa has expanded its public works projects to increase employment 
opportunities for the unemployed population. Ethiopia can introduce comparable 
schemes to keep the youth gainfully employed whilst simultaneously widening lawful 
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possibilities to migrate for those who wish to do so. As regards Somalia, improved 
migration opportunities would entail gaining access to valid travel documents, a 
possibility that may be actualised once the country enjoys greater security and has 
established national institutions in the areas of public administration, justice and 
governance.141 However, regular migration from the north of the country remains 
restricted pending recognition of the semi-autonomous state of Puntland and the self-
declared independent region of Somaliland. 
Kenya is already benefitting from the savvy business acumen of the Somali 
community.  It would therefore be worthwhile to legitimise their various business 
interests with a view to enhancing revenue collection which will, in turn, benefit the 
entire Kenyan population and the economy as a whole. 
Kenya also needs to ease the real or imaginary bottlenecks that obstruct entry 
into Kenya for Ethiopians and Somalis. This would entail tackling corruption at the 
points of entry. Public information campaigns may prove a useful resource in this 
regard. The Kenya-Somali border, despite its being officially closed by Kenya in 2007, 
remains porous. Ineffective policing along the border is attributed to scarce resources. 
The fact of the matter is that the Kenyan government has simply to remunerate law 
enforcement officers better in line with current economic realities. The paltry monthly 
salary of approximately US$400 that immigration officers earn is indefensible and not 
viable.  A modest increase in salary would obviously never rival what is earned through 
corrupt practices, but given the fact that the amount paid to law enforcers has been 
repeatedly cited as the chief reason for the corruption, the Kenyan Government needs to 
give urgent attention to this matter. President Uhuru Kenyatta promised to act on these 
matters when he delivered his inaugural speech to Parliament on 17 April 2013. On the 
topic of corruption, the President was more emphatic when he stated the following: “I 
will act swiftly to end the scourge of corruption. Corruption makes our country less 
attractive as an investment destination. It limits access to much needed services, stifles 
efficiency and eats away at public values.” 142 
Lastly, the old adage, “knowledge is power”, remains valid.  Humanitarian and 
development imperatives targeted at providing Ethiopian and Somali migrants with 
crucial information, especially with regard to their right to seek asylum in Kenya, would 
benefit them enormously. Informing the migrants of their rights necessarily entails the 
corollary obligation on the part of the Kenyan government to ensure that those rights 
are safeguarded. It is indeed ridiculous that migrants from Ethiopia have free passage to 
Kenya, but are still compelled to pay large amounts in bribes for visitors’ stamps.  The 
information campaign would need to be accompanied by a legislative review of the 
entry and stay in Kenya of Ethiopian migrants. Such a review should not necessarily 
result in the curtailing of entry, for this might have just the opposite effect. Perhaps free 
entry should be expanded to include the right to freedom of movement and to gain 
                                                 
141 See Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (UN Security Council S/2013/69 of 31 Jan 2013) at 
paras 65-70 regarding the challenges Somalia faces in becoming a functioning state. 
142 Full text available at www.politicsabroad.com/.../full-text-of-president-uhuru-kenyatta-speech 
(accessed on 28 January 2015). 
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access to economic opportunities for Ethiopians in Kenya. For instance, Kenya entered 
into a bilateral agreement with Ethiopia in 2014, the terms of which will allow the 
citizens of each country freedom of movement and freedom to conduct trade in the 
other country. This is a commendable starting point, which could lead to increasing the 
legal migration options for Ethiopians.  
Public information campaigns need to be geared towards dispelling myths and 
prejudices associated with migration. For instance, in the 1980s and 1990s, the USA was 
very attractive for aspirant Kenyan emigrants. But this is no longer the case, as would-
be emigrants have since come to learn from diaspora-based utterances of the trying 
conditions under which African migrants in the USA have to live. Perhaps this change of 
mind has to do with the fact that Kenya has become more democratic in recent years, 
with more opportunities opening up in the economy. Whilst this might be the case, it 
does not derogate from the fact that the information about the hardships encountered 
by the Kenyan diaspora in America has no doubt dampened the desire to emigrate to 
North America. As regards the irregular movements of Ethiopian and Somali migrants 
under discussion, it is important that they, too, know about the hazards they could face 
when making their way southwards through the Eastern migration corridor.143 This 
would enable them to make hard but informed decisions about their migratory plans, 
preparing them psychologically to cope with the troubles that lurk beyond the borders 
of their respective motherlands.  
11.2 Prosecution 
The need to decriminalise the smuggled migrant and to criminalise the facilitators and 
profiteers of this movement cannot be overstated.  Thus far, Kenya has dedicated the 
bulk of its resources and time to the prosecution and deportation of the smuggled 
migrant, rather than targeting organisers, facilitators and profiteers of the movement. 
Presently, law enforcement officers can no longer claim a restrictive legislative 
framework. The smuggling of migrants is now defined in the Kenya Citizenship and 
Immigration Act and is criminalised. The Prevention of Organised Crimes Act and the 
Money Laundering Act can also be applied creatively in prosecuting conduct related to 
the smuggling of migrants.  
The smuggled migrants themselves constitute an invaluable resource in 
identifying and providing supporting evidence in the prosecution of their smugglers. 
Kenya should consider dealing with irregular migrants, particularly from Ethiopia and 
Somalia, administratively, as opposed to subjecting them to detention and prosecution. 
Somalis should be directed to the asylum process. Ethiopians, in collaboration with their 
                                                 
143 In South Africa, shops owned by foreigners, including Somalis, have been the target of sporadic 
outbreaks of attacks by local township residents. For example, several Somali shopkeepers were killed 
when their shops were burned down in 2008. For a critical assessment of the allegation that Somalis are 
the victims of xenophobic violence, see Charman A & Piper L “Xenophobia, criminality and violent 
entrepreneurship: violence against Somalis in Delft South, Cape Town, South Africa” (2012) 43 South 
African Review of Sociology 82. Available at 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10566/554/CharmanSomaliShopkeepers2012.pdf
?sequence=3 (accessed 12 January 2015). 
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government, should be granted safe passage and assisted with their return where 
necessary. Intermediate to the above interventions should be the provision of 
humanitarian assistance to smuggled migrants.  
Impunity cannot continue to persist with regard to corrupt public officials 
fuelling the irregular movement.  Foot soldiers who collect extorted funds must be 
prosecuted and be subjected to administrative or disciplinary action, which may include 
summary dismissal. In recent years the Kenya Revenue Authority has tightened up the 
loopholes for corruption, beginning at the lowest level. As a result, revenue collection 
has increased. A similar model should be explored for the Kenyan immigration and 
police service. 
11.3 Protection 
The Smuggling Protocol is a law enforcement instrument. It clearly did not envision the 
catastrophic humanitarian crisis in Somalia. The Protocol may also be far from relatable 
to the economic peculiarities, coupled with political persecution, experienced by some 
sections of the Ethiopian population.  
Unfortunately, not all smuggled migrants fall within the ambit of protection 
guaranteed by the international legal framework that applies to refugees and asylum 
seekers. It is acknowledged that migrants’ rights are abused during the smuggling 
process. Additionally, what begins as a mutual agreement may end up in an exploitative 
situation, whether or not it falls strictly within the legal definition of human trafficking. 
It has been suggested that reception centres be set up where migrants can 
receive emergency and humanitarian assistance and be given relevant information 
while their status is being determined. These may, however, become rest stops that 
migrants make during the smuggling process.  Assisted voluntary return, where 
possible, must be coordinated with the respective governments and relevant 
international actors for purposes of granting migrants safe passage for their return. 
11.4 Co-operation 
Refugee protection is a shared international obligation. Transnational movements are 
tackled most effectively with international co-operation and support. Tanzania and 
Kenya are in the process of signing a bilateral agreement to control smugglers and curb 
illegal transit through their common borders.144The Regional Consultative Process 
spearheaded by IGAD, UNHCR and IOM, in collaboration with the relevant government 
departments has the potential collectively to address irregular flows of migrants from 
Ethiopia and Somalia.  
12 CONCLUSION 
A supportive legislative framework may be the catalyst for stemming irregular 
movement from the Horn of Africa southwards. However, too often the perception of 
                                                 
144 “Tanzania to co-operate in efforts to control smugglers” Tanzania Daily News 11 September 2012. 
Available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201209110067.html (accessed 4 January 2015). 
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corruption, poor legislation, and poverty are related to this movement in such abstract 
terms, that they can serve merely as a scapegoat, an excuse for policy makers and 
implementers of that policy to shun their duties and obligations, and as a pretext for 
migrants to justify their actions. 
The smuggling process is expensive. Money paid to facilitators could be used in 
the country of origin to improve the economic circumstances of potential migrants in a 
more enduring way, than to abandon them to the vicissitudes of a perilous journey 
across hazardous wastelands, unscrupulous border officials and an unfamiliar 
destination.  Smuggling fees could be ploughed back creatively into the economies of the 
countries of origin, even in a small way. 
Kenya has no excuse for failing to chastise the corrupt conduct of public officials. 
Lack of political will and low salaries for law enforcement officials impact drastically on 
the human dignity and the lives of migrants. Laxity in security was heavily paid for by 
Kenya, resulting in its 2011-2012 war efforts in Somalia, as well as a deadly terrorist 
attack at the Westgate mall in Nairobi in September 2013, Mpeketoni in 2014 and 
Garissa University College in 2015.  It may be argued that the war wage bill could have 
been put to better use for improving the country’s security infrastructure. Migrants and 
citizens alike have a duty to refuse to condone public acts of corruption where relevant 
authorities have failed. Kenya must simply maintain a solid commitment to address the 
irregular flows of migrants from its neighbours in practical ways, prosecute criminal 
elements facilitating these flows, and protect the rights of migrants caught in the 
crossfire. Kenya, which has the third largest number of refugees in the world in relation 
to its economic capacity per capita, would benefit immeasurably from increased 
international support in shouldering this duty. Below is a map showing the migration 
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